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University of Virginia 
With the rapid development of the Internet of Things, there are many 
interacting devices and applications. One crucial challenge is how to provide 
security. Our proposal for a new direction is to create "smart buttons" and 
collections of them called "smart blankets" as hardware/software security 
patches rather than software-only patches. 
1.0 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) market is forecasted to reach 30.7 billion devices in 2020 and 
grow to 75.4 billion devices by 2025.1 At such a rapid pace, more and more new connected 
devices, as well as applications such as autonomous vehicles, smart homes, and smart 
cities, are appearing on the Internet. In the future, the Internet of Trillions of Things (IoTT) 
will include trillions of things (smart devices), with many different types of devices and 
communications, and an increasing variety of applications. Applications will both, directly 
and indirectly, interact with users, devices, other applications, and the environment. For 
example, in smart home environments, there already exists IoT devices such as security 
cameras, smart locks, garage door openers, smart thermostats, smoke detectors and they 
are all connected on the Internet. There are also Industrial IoT systems where perhaps 
thousands of devices are monitoring and controlling a process control plant. These IoT-
based industrial plants may interact with other plants with just-in-time delivery of natural 
resources required by the plants, with humans in the plants, and with decision makers. Most 
industries (if not all) will make use of smart IoT devices.2 Smart cities are seeing an ever-
increasing deployment of sensors, actuators, and services to monitor and control 
transportation, emergency services, pollution, energy, health, etc. Once large IoT systems 
are installed, they will potentially exist for a long time. 
For the IoT, security is extremely challenging, in general, and will be even more 
challenging in the future when IoTT comes into play. New challenges for security in IoTT 
are due to many factors. The interactions with the physical world through these trillions of 
smart devices have increased the attack surface dramatically. Attacks generally span across 
3 layers: physical, communication, and application. For the physical layer, the fact that the 
smart devices exist in open environments exposes them to tampering. Attackers can also 
attack the devices indirectly by changing the surrounding environment that the devices are 
monitoring. Communications are mostly via various wireless technologies, allowing easy 
access to devices and applications. The great heterogeneity among devices and 
communications complicates security solutions. Applications and services will often 
include software that is installed on the device to control it. Applications and services can 
also include communications between devices via software that is installed on the system 
to manage the workflow of many connected devices. 
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As a new direction and because of the new security problems raised by the IoTT, we 
introduce a new type of security patch that combines hardware and software (HW/SW). 
The goal for this device called a “smart button” is to improve response to security attacks 
for IoTT, especially because of the physical aspects of these systems. Collections of smart 
buttons will become “smart blankets” which can be considered a type of security HW/SW 
middleware targeted towards security protection. Smart buttons will operate at 3 levels of 
focus: the physical, communication, and application layers in the IoTT. For each layer, we 
can create specific parameterized buttons to form a basic repository of HW/SW security 
patches. When attacks are detected, the right sets of smart buttons are selected, configured, 
and deployed as smart blankets. When there is a large number of attacks happening at the 
same time, solutions will include blankets of smart blankets. The repository of HW/SW 
security patches will grow over time as the attack-solution arms race continues. It is 
important to note that each IoTT system will have its own security measures (e.g., 
redundancy, secure keys, encryption, blockchains). We are not proposing ideas to build a 
secure IoTT application in the first place, but to “cover” it with our smart buttons and 
blankets when unanticipated attacks occur and when standard software-only patching 
techniques fail to work, or it is not feasible to replace devices and reinstall the software 
with the new fixes. 
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2.0 What is a HW/SW patch, its benefits, and challenges? 
 
Figure 1: Overview structure of a smart button. Collections of these constitute 
Smart Blankets 
A HW/SW patch (a smart button - See Figure 1) combines sensors, actuators, processors, 
and memory with associated software to protect IoT devices against one or more specific 
security attacks. In some cases, it also includes wireless communications to report the 
attack. It is meant to be used in IoTT systems where the physical world and smart devices 
are key components. When collections of HW/SW patches are deployed together in a 
cooperative fashion, this is called a smart blanket. 
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The smart buttons and blankets proposed solutions have several advantages: 
• They can be applied to legacy devices and legacy applications/services as billions 
of them already exist and it is not feasible to retrofit or exchange them in a short 
term. 
• Concepts found in the smart buttons can be useful for future designs of secure smart 
devices. In other words, IoTT devices should themselves become more supportive 
of security over time and this smart button solution is a mechanism to learn what 
they should look like. 
• Even devices with previous protections embedded in them may not be able to 
handle zero-day attacks (i.e., new attacks that have never been seen before). In this 
case, new buttons with new defense mechanisms can then be added. 
• In some situations, smart buttons can be used for extra security BEFORE any 
attacks are detected. For example, disaster response teams may be planning for 
deployment due to an environmental disaster and install buttons to help thwart an 
adversary who might try to exacerbate the environmental disaster situation. 
• We can create a smart button repository to facilitate quickly creating HW/SW 
patches when they are needed for a specific attack. 
• Because our smart button solution is a HW/SW patch (i.e., a device), it directly 
targets the physical nature of IoTT. 
Despite the potential advantages, there are many open research challenges for smart 
buttons and blankets. These challenges include: 
• The time and effort to create smart buttons. 
• The deployment strategy, energy issues, and maintenance for smart buttons. 
• How to protect the buttons themselves? 
• What attack models can this solution address? 
• What can individual buttons do themselves? When and how is the cooperation 
between the buttons required? 
• How to handle the scale of trillions of things on the Internet? 
• How to interface the buttons to IoTT systems? 
3.0 Case Studies 
This section demonstrates the value of smart buttons and blankets through hypothetical 
case studies. The case studies, in total, show the value of our approach for physical, 
communication, and application layers of an IoTT system. It is important to note that we 
have developed prototypes of HW/SW solutions for three out of these four case studies. 
To better illustrate the core concepts, interfacing issues are not discussed in these 
examples. However, interfacing (See Figure 1) is a critical challenge and we devote Section 
4 to interfacing discussion. Another critical challenge is secondary attacks (i.e., attacking 
the smart buttons after they are deployed). These case studies assume that there is no attack 
on the buttons themselves. However, we address this issue in Section 5. 
3.1 Physical Layer Attack: 
Consider a fixed-position surveillance camera. Assume that a smart camera was 
installed in the front door of a house, and it is supposed to be mostly remain fixed in 
position. In this case, any movement of the camera that is not made by the legitimate user 
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such as physically repointing or relocating the camera is considered malicious. To detect 
this attack, it may be possible to install a software-only patch on the camera that relies on 
the camera’s capabilities such as image and video capture of background and detecting that 
the background is moving to detect attacks. However, leveraging such capabilities requires 
a lot of computational power that the camera may not have enough resources to provide or 
the internals of the camera software may be proprietary. In this scenario, if a smart button 
is used (e.g., adding an accelerometer and software to detect movement via the 
accelerometer and send an alarm if necessary), there are no changes to the camera and this 
attack can be detected. We built a prototype of the smart button to address this attack 
scenario. Our button provides acceleration sensing capability from an accelerometer, which 
the camera does not have in the first place, to detect any malicious movement of the camera. 
Note that there are many other attack situations where a similar solution can apply, but 
perhaps other sensors are used such as temperature, vibration, gyroscopes, etc. As one 
example, if an attacker has infiltrated the control software for keeping the temperature of a 
chemical process below a threshold, that attacker can cause overheating. A new HW/SW 
patch that is independent of the previous system can be added to avoid this attack! 
3.2 Communication Layer Attack: 
Consider jamming. Since the IoTT will rely heavily on wireless communications, 
addressing security attacks in this area are paramount. Jamming is a popular type of denial-
of-service attack technique that leverages the transmission of signals to block the target 
wireless communications. Jamming attacks can vary in mechanisms and implementations. 
These attacks can exist in any IoTT application domain, e.g., smart homes and smart cities. 
Consider an interrupt jamming attack that is simple to perpetrate by using an attacking node 
(i.e., jammer) that disrupts communication. In interrupt jamming, the jammer only 
transmits when there are valid radio activities, which ensures stealthy attacks over a long 
term as signal transmission is energy-consuming. In previous work, we developed 
DEEJAM3 as a novel MAC-layer protocol for defeating stealthy jammers with IEEE 
802.15.4-based hardware. This solution has four layered HW/SW defensive mechanisms 
to hide the jammed system communication from a jammer and to communicate with a new 
channel. This solution is a HW/SW solution and could be considered as one concrete 
example of a smart button for a set of jamming attacks. The performance of the protocol 
was shown to be robust against successively more complex attacks: interrupt jamming 
addressed by frame masking, activity jamming addressed by channel hopping, scan 
jamming addressed by packet fragmentation, and pulse jamming addressed by redundant 
encoding. In summary, if a jamming attack is detected, we can add a smart button with 
DEEJAM protocol to each node in the system and protect against a set of jamming attacks 
on the original system. 
3.3 Application Layer Attack: 
Consider Stuxnet worm attack. The Stuxnet worm attack on Iranian Nuclear 
Facilities discovered in 20104 is a very famous attack targeting programmable logic 
controllers (PLC). Basically, when the Stuxnet worm infects a PLC, it looks for the 
software that controls devices (e.g., manufacturing devices, robot arms, power plant 
controllers, etc.) and patches the software with malicious code. Stuxnet has functionality 
to hide itself, send malicious commands to the devices controlled by PLCs, and send fake 
feedback to users as if everything is working correctly. However, it cannot hide the 
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physical actions of the devices it controls. In this case, smart buttons with independent 
hardware capabilities can more easily detect the Stuxnet attack rather than the software 
patch alone on the device. Further, any new software-only security patch once installed 
may itself be subject to the Stuxnet logic. In general, depending on the smart devices 
involved in the original system, the HW/SW patch might use motion, temperature, 
magnetic, electric field, etc. sensing. 
3.4 Cross-Layer Attack: 
Consider Amazon Echo. Currently, many users are using virtual personal assistant 
(VPA) services such as Amazon Echo or Google Home in their home to control other smart 
home devices. However, these VPAs are vulnerable to hidden voice commands which are 
recognized by devices but not by humans.5 For example, an attacker can leverage some 
attack vectors in smart home environment that play sounds such as television, radio station, 
and smartphones in order to send obfuscated voice commands embedded in streaming 
videos or podcasts to control a user’s Amazon Echo. In this case, one can use a smart button 
to differentiate the legitimate user’s voice command from the remote attacker’s voice 
command. If the legitimate user sends a critical command to the Echo device in their living 
room, the smart button will send an audio pulse followed by post-processing to determine 
if that user is actually present in the room. In particular, the device can analyze the 
reflections received by a microphone array to sense presence of the person. In previous 
work, we built a prototype of this solution for the Amazon Echo and achieved 93.13% 
accuracy of identifying attacks during critical commands.6 
4.0 Interfacing Issues 
A key research challenge is interfacing the smart buttons to the IoTT and to each other. 
The challenges vary depending on the situation. We consider 5 categories of interfaces: 
indirect, direct with little or no assumptions about the application, direct with knowledge 
of the application, button to button, and blanket to blanket. In each case, there are two 
aspects that the button must address: detection and action. Note that smart buttons are 
expected to have their own energy sources so we do not discuss any interfacing issues with 
using the energy of the original system, even though sometimes it may be possible to do 
that. 
Indirect. In some situations, a button will be mounted upon a "smart thing/device" and 
need only monitor it in indirect ways. For example, we can attach a smart button to a smart 
camera that has fixed orientation and the smart button can monitor if the camera is moved 
(via an accelerometer in the smart button). In this case, no direct interaction is required for 
the device. Once a violation occurs, the smart button must wirelessly report it as an alarm 
to a monitoring station. Such a solution can apply in many cases that protect against 
unwarranted movement, change in speed of movement, excess vibrations, an increase in 
temperature, etc. 
Direct without much knowledge. Since a button is a HW/SW entity, it can attach 
to IoTT devices and applications in various ways. For situations where the button designer 
is not aware of the details of devices and/or applications, we propose to treat the smart 
button as an input/output device with a driver. The driver may be specific to a given IoT 
device and/or an operating system, so this abstraction allows buttons to connect to any 
existing device with a known interface with minimal new development beyond the driver 
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that bridges the button application programming interface (API) to the existing interface. 
Direct with knowledge. In some situations, the smart buttons deployment team might 
be aware of the internals of the smart IoT devices. For example, a processor of a smart IoT 
system can execute as a fog computing processor. That means that the fog device may be 
running various big data analytics and attempting to protect its local data with security-
aware data structures. If the smart button is aware of these implementation details and can 
directly access the data (via a direct with knowledge interface), then more sophisticated 
security detection and actions will be possible. For instance, the smart button may detect 
that the data structure is corrupted or has received bad values and whether that the analytics 
program is not executing properly. 
Button to button. Since smart buttons are created by the security team, their interface 
to each other (via the wireless transceivers) can be standard. There would be a button-to-
button communication interface with the following characteristics: wirelessly 
communicates, can reach at least 100 feet to potentially limit the numbers of buttons needed 
(e.g., LoRa can achieve this distance), encrypts data and control signals during 
communication, can utilize different frequencies, can detect jamming, and supports 
transferring (exchanging) of security intrusion detection, attack information, and blanket 
control commands. The button-to-button communication network can be used directly as 
a redundancy method for detecting or protecting communication layer attacks to the IoTT 
network. 
Blanket to blanket. Our hypothesis is that once we add a smart blanket to a system 
we can consider it as an integral part of the original system, so adding yet another blanket 
should be no different than adding the first one, and it can follow the interfacing strategies 
described above. However, various optimizations may be possible across blankets. For 
example, a more sophisticated feature in the second blanket may obviate the need for one 
or more protections in the first blanket. 
5.0 Subsequent Attacks: Attacking the Security Buttons 
Once a smart button or smart blanket is deployed to protect against a particular security 
attack, the attacker can attempt to attack the HW/SW patches. If the attack is successful, 
then either the previous smart blankets must be replaced with new smart buttons that 
protect against both the original system attack and the new attack, or one can consider a 
new smart blanket of HW/SW patches to be added on to the previous solution - a type of 
layers of smart buttons. 
Note that collections of smart buttons forming the smart security blanket for a given 
security attack will communicate among themselves and offer various redundancies and 
diversity modalities. For example, the buttons can communicate with each other with 
security properties similar to those discussed above for protecting the communications of 
IoTT services. They can form consensus on both sensor readings and control actuations by 
the redundancy they provide. They can also use alternative sensing (orthogonal) modalities 
to avoid various physical attacks. There are many consensus schemes that can be 
implemented. Blockchain is an open, decentralized digital ledger technology that creates a 
secure way for the exchange of data. It is being widely touted and applied to IoT at the 
application layer. It might be possible to develop a lightweight blockchain for smart 
blankets. Hashing, proof of-work, and consensus found in blockchains may be too costly 
in time, memory, and energy requirements to be an effective smart blanket mechanism. 
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However, the size of a blanket and its lifetime are mitigating factors that can be exploited 
in attempting to develop a lightweight blockchain solution. If blockchain proves too costly, 
one might consider less expensive consensus solutions (albeit with less protection). 
6.0 Discussion 
The open IoTT environment where systems of systems are dynamically interacting in 
direct and indirect ways produces increasingly complicated attack surfaces. Software 
patches alone may often work. However, they are constrained by existing hardware 
capabilities of the device. Furthermore, sophisticated attacks always have mitigation 
techniques against defense mechanism (i.e., trying to hide from defense systems on the 
target device or disable them). Thus, successfully defending against those types of attacks 
may require installing additional hardware capabilities to the device. Installing security 
patches either in software form or hardware form on a system often requires shutting it 
down or reboot it as we can see in existing computing platforms. For example, installing 
Microsoft Windows updates always asking (if not forcing) the users to restart their 
computers to apply changes. Another example is when people need to send the product 
back to the manufacturer for repair or replacement due to hardware security issues. Security 
solutions must operate over long lifetimes where the dynamic evolution of the environment 
and apps are continuously happening. For example, smart cities transportation may deploy 
10,000 smart devices for vehicles which must last for many years and evolve as the city 
evolves. Often we cannot shut down such a large running system to install security patches 
due to the fact that it takes a lot of time to restart large systems. Also, these systems can 
include critical operations which may cause severe problems if they are not working for 
even a short period of time. Imagine if the traffic control system is shut down for a moment, 
there would be a lot of traffic jams and accidents. A consequence of these complexities for 
IoTT is that the security attacks arms race will get worse and new approaches are required. 
We also hypothesize that there is no way to prevent all security attacks a priori. The system 
of systems is too dynamic, uncertain, heterogeneous, and continuously evolving. The 
security arms race will not end soon and a HW/SW patch is another tool that can sometimes 
be a better solution than traditional patching techniques. 
Given that many IoTT applications will be large-scale, it is necessary to consider 
developing solutions that do not require EVERY device (sensor/actuator) to have a button 
attached to it. For example, if there are 10,000 smart devices in the subway system of New 
York City and there is a new attack requiring smart buttons, we need to develop solutions 
that can protect the system WITHOUT attaching a button to EVERY one of the 10,000 
devices. In this case, new solutions must be created where individual buttons can protect 
sets of devices. The approach is twofold. One, smart buttons can act as HW/SW patch hubs. 
The hubs (analogous to routing hubs) will aggregate information from sets of devices, 
detect, and protect the devices based on the cumulative properties of those devices. Two, 
smart buttons can act as part of the fog, typically executing on a more powerful machine 
to provide local processing. 
7.0 Related Work 
IoT security area is growing in importance. Due to the rapid development of IoT devices, 
there exists a set of emergent threats to smart homes. New capabilities of smart home 
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technologies lead to new consequences of some traditional attacks and enable more 
sophisticated attacks on IoT devices, including illegal physical entry and privacy 
violations.7 There has been a lot of research on security and safety risks of IoT in three 
different categories: hardware, communication, and application. 
Hardware. Recently, extensive research is going on to explore new security attacks on 
IoT devices. Researchers presented vulnerabilities of existing smart locks that would allow 
attackers to gain sensitive user information and unauthorized access to the home.8 They 
highlighted design flaws, diversity in smart devices with different types of sensors, and 
lack of proper administration as key factors in those attacks. Other studies have shown that 
proper protections against malicious attacks are missing for sensors largely used in the 
smart devices. Sensors are vulnerable to spoofing by transduction attacks. Even without 
special-purpose equipments, an adversary can easily exploit physics to manipulate the 
outputs of sensors, causing unexpected behaviors of the systems that rely on those sensors. 
For example, the attacker can play sounds embedded in a Youtube video to control the 
output of a smartphone’s microelectromechanical system accelerometer.9 
Communication. IoT devices will be using fog computing which acts as an 
intermediate layer for securing the data stored in the cloud. However, the integration of 
IoT devices with the public cloud introduces additional security and safety threats.10 A 
well-practiced architecture for smart home is to connect multiple IoT devices to a single 
smart hub or router. As IoT devices can connect to a WiFi network for communicating 
with the cloud, it becomes easier to connect them all to the same network and enable 
communications between them using that local network. Unfortunately, neither a WiFi 
router nor the protocol used in the router was initially designed to support this type of 
connectivity among the smart devices, as a result, it poses a new security challenge. The 
presence of a security firewall (i.e., preventing illegal access of one device from the other 
devices) in the network layer is emerging as multiple devices are operating on the same 
network and some of them might get compromised due to the lack of security. And with 
the help of the malicious device, an attacker can attack other devices connected to the same 
network, causing massive damage to the smart home users. In this case, the firewall would 
serve as a defense, protecting all other devices from the infected one. Researchers discussed 
a security manager platform built on top of an IoT hub to monitor usage patterns of all IoT 
devices in the home and detect anomalous network activities.11 Furthermore, for short-
range and power-efficient communication purpose especially in smart home environment, 
ZigBee and Z-Wave protocols are widely used in IoT devices. Researchers identified the 
existence of threats in those protocols due to implementation failures and shortfalls. A 
practical security analysis showed that Zigbee protocol was designed for easy setup and 
usage, thus exposing vulnerabilities that would allow attackers to easily jam the 
communication or sniff the transmitted network key.12 An implementation error in Z-Wave 
key exchange protocol could allow attackers to take full control of a door lock by using a 
low-cost Z-Wave packet interception and injection tool.13 In some cases, the misuse of 
some network protocols can cause severe security and privacy problems. People largely 
believe in the security of autonomous system and they often consider it as a trustworthy 
system. 
Application. There has been some recent research on security analysis of smart home 
applications. Researchers analyzed Samsung’s SmartThings which has the largest number 
of applications among currently available smart home platforms and presented an attack 
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where malicious applications can steal sensitive information such as lock codes of the IoT 
devices.14 Their analysis showed that over 55% of applications in SmartThings 
marketplace are overprivileged. Hence, an application can gain full access to a device even 
if it only needs limited access to the device. Although IoT platforms such as SmartThings 
require users to grant permissions to applications, malicious applications tend to request 
for unneeded permissions and users often do not know what those applications actually do 
behind the scenes. Additionally, the interaction chains between applications can pose high 
risks to smart home users. A recent study on 185 official SmartThings applications has 
shown that 37 out of 162 hidden inter-application interaction chains through physical 
surroundings are considered highly dangerous to the safety of users.15 
8.0 Conclusion 
In this article, we propose a novel research direction to handle security attacks in the era 
of IoTT. This proposed solution approach is based on adding integrated hardware and 
software patches as a security monitoring and protection layer to the existing devices 
(things). One important lesson learned from this work is that software-only patches can 
solve many security issues in IoTT, but not all of them. Many security issues cannot be 
detected by software-only patches due to missing hardware capabilities in the device. Thus, 
we introduce the smart button and smart blanket solution to fill these gaps. Although being 
an effective solution, smart buttons and blankets still have many open challenges such as 
protecting themselves from attacks, synergistic interaction between different types of 
buttons in a form of a blanket to protect against complex security scenarios, and smooth 
interfacing with existing IoT devices. With new solutions for these issues, security defenses 
for the future IoTT can be significantly improved. 
References 
1. IHS Markit, “IoT: Number of Connected Devices Worldwide 2015-2025,” Statista, 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/IoT-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide. 
2. “Industry IoT Growth Trends”, https://innovationatwork.ieee.org/industry-iot-growth-trends. 
3. A. D. Wood et. al, “DEEJAM: Defeating Energy-Efficient Jamming in IEEE 802.15.4-based Wireless 
Networks,” in IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and 
Networks (SECON), 2007. 
4. D. Kushner, "The Real Story of Stuxnet," in IEEE Spectrum, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 48-53, March 2013. 
5. N. Carlini et. al, “Hidden Voice Commands,” in USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 513-530, 2016. 
6. A. Alanwar et. al, “EchoSafe: Sonar-based Verifiable Interaction with Intelligent 
Digital Agents,” ACM Workshop on the Internet of Safe Things, 2017. 
7. T. Denning et. al, “Computer Security and the Modern Home,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 56, no. 1, 
pp. 94-103, 2013. 
8. G. Ho et. al, “Smart Locks:  Lessons for Securing Commodity Internet of Things Devices,” in Proceedings of 
the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS), pp. 461-472, 2016. 
9. K. Fu et. al, “Risks of Trusting the Physics of Sensors,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 20-
23, 2018. 
10. C. Stergiou et. al, “Secure Integration of IoT and Cloud Computing,” in Future Generation Computer Systems, 
vol. 78, pp. 964-975, 2018. 
 11 
11. A. K. Simpson et. al, “Securing Vulnerable Home IoT Devices with an In-Hub Security Manager,”  in 1st 
International Workshop on Pervasive Smart Living Spaces (PerLS), 2017. 
12. T. Zillner et. al, “Zigbee Exploited - The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly,” BlackHat USA, 2015. 
13. B. Fouladi et. al, “Security Evaluation of the Z-Wave Wireless Protocol,” BlackHat USA, 2013. 
14. E. Fernandes et. al, “Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications,” in IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy (S&P), 2016. 
15. W. Ding et. al, “On the Safety of IoT Device Physical Interaction Control,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM 
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pp. 832-846, 2018. 
John A. Stankovic is the BP America Professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of 
Virginia. His research interests are in cyber physical systems, the Internet of Things, and Smart Health. 
His PhD is from Brown University. Contact him at stankovic@cs.virginia.edu. 
Tu Le is a PhD student in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Virginia. His research 
interests are in Security & Privacy, Internet of Things, and Human-Computer Interaction. Contact him at 
tnl6wk@virginia.edu. 
Abdeltawab Hendawi is a Research Associate in the Department of Computer Science at the University of 
Virginia. His research interests are in big data management and analytics, and smart cities. Contact him at 
hendawi@virginia.edu. 
Yuan Tian is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Virginia. Her 
research interests are in security and privacy, and the Internet of Things. Her PhD is from Carnegie Mellon 
University. Contact her at yuant@virginia.edu. 
